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Benjamin Buchloh's cs ay "Figures of Authority, Ciphers of Regression" has 
become entral to many of the di cussions and polemics concened with 
the new European painting, its market surge, and current representational 
painting in general. In re-reading it recently, I was troubled by the manner in 
which it represent hi tory. What follows arc simply some notes in which I 
hav' tried to draw out the implications of that history and to point out a 
few contradictions in the text itself. I have u ed the version contained in th' 
<'X client Mdernism and Mdernity, which is a compilation of paper given 
at the 1981 Vancouver Conference on Modernism; a longer version wa 
published in Octob r 76. I have tried to lift Buchloh's reprc entation of 
history out of the text a a whole, to examine it more or less autonomously. 
Thu these notes arc, to some extent, di engag d from the specifics of th' 
hi torical argument which his essay makes. But I do not think that how 
hi toy-and especially art history-i represented can ever be abstract for 
working artists. Any monolithic repre cntation of history will efface the 
actual practice and the actual commitments of many artists: it i on<' of th 
moment in which artists exp ricncc the critic as a power ct over us, 
l<'gislating history rather than recognizing it a complex, di ontinuou , 
conflictual, disorganizing . . .
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History as Teleology 
Aspecific view of history forms the ground for Buchloh's judgemens 
of a range of works and practices from both the period following the 
first World War and from our own. It is a view woven into the 
vocabulary of the essay. Thus we read and enter a history of 
"obsolete modes" and "obsolescence" (p. 107), "retrograde 
contemporary art" (p. 81 ), "materially, perceptually, and cognitively 
primitivist forms of signification" (p. 108) ... 
This vocabulary is already a history which can be distinguished in is 
salient aspects. The notion of "obsolescence" in art, for instance, can 
only mean that art develops technically, since it is only within the 
technical sphere that we can refer explicitly to modes of production 
which have entirely replaced earlier modes. Secondly, "a retrograde 
contemporary art" -an apparent contradiction in terms-construcs 
or displays a history which is linear, continuous, progressive. But 
further, it means that the end toward which history is moving must 
be clear, for only then can a retrograde work be distinguished against 
the certain direction of the larger progressive history. It would also 
entail an artwork which is unambiguous in its meaning and in its 
historical alignment, even at the moment of its first appearing, even 
to those who are also enmeshed in that same moment. The work 
cannot be subject to any process of on-going interpretation and re­
interpretation, any conflict of voices which could radically reassess 
its political trajectory or de-stabilize its already understood meanin� 
Nothing can be unforseen. 
Buchloh's history is a one-way street in a technical domain. More 
radical or advanced practices, whether in painting (such as 
Malevich's Black Square) or outside it (such as the �eadymade), rendr 
representational practices in painting obsolete by 1 5. But any 
unilinear history which attempts to maintain itself as a simple 
continuity will run up against situations it cannot encapsulate, which 
seem to be anomalies threatening it from "outside". One such problm 
for Buchloh's history is that the obsolete practices did not disappear, 
were not replaced by the new mdes. What can it mean to say that an 
obsolete mode continued? 
Buchloh is in trouble here simply because his representation of histoy 
is univocal, technical, continuous, unilinear ... Thus it cannot 
accommdate itself to what actually occurred which was that the 
Black Square and the Readymade did not replace the already existing 
modes and representational practices. Perhaps it would be more 
accurate to say that they added new practices to an already multili�l 
discontinuous, conflictual situation and increased the level of tensin. 
A histoy of "obsolescence" seems more of a wish-fulfillment than a 
useful history-a wish that certain mdes of production and 
representational means which may e unfortunately durable could e 
surpassed even when the social structures which maintained them sti 
endure. 
This attempt to solve within the representation of history what 
remained unresolved in practice structures the text and its strategies 
from the first rhetorical question: 
How is it that we are nearly forced to believe that the 
return to traditional modes of representation in painting 
around 191 5, two years after the Readymade and the 
Black Square, was a shift of great historical or aesthetic 
impot? 
The question itself is written over a contradictory relationship of te 
author to history. If Buchloh is to remain allied to a history which can 
simply declare the obsolescence of certain modes, then obviou ly 
there is no need to concern either the reader or himself with the 
unimportant, beyond revealing that its asserted "importance" is fae 
But if the majority of the essay concerns itself with representationin 
painting as being, or leading to, authoritarianism, and with the 
relevance of that analysis for current practices, then in the most 
apparent way, the unimportant is being revealed as something 
necessary to address, and to address with the full rhetorical force 
with which the essay is written. If this "shift" is necessary to addrs 
and to analyze at length, then much of the rhetorical strategy, the 
vocabulary, and the manner in which history is represented will 
to be discarded. The strategy of the essay is a contradictory rhet 
which proclaims the false importance of representation in painti 
while all the same dealing with its continuing centrality within at 
s when the relation of the avant-garde to the society outside its 
'meter can no longer be taken for granted. 
essay concludes with a paragraph where the voice of the author 
the voice of history seem to coincide. The text finishes, history is 
d off and the author speaks for history itself: 
The aesthetic attraction of these eclectic painting prac­tices originates in a nostalgia for that moment in the past when the painting modes to which they refer had histori­cal authenticity. But the spectre of historical derivative­ness hovers over every contemporary attempt to resu rrect figuration , representation , and traditional 
modes of production. This is not so much because they actually derive from particular precedents, but because their attempt to reestablish forlorn aesthetic positions immediately situates them in historical secondariness. 
autho r knows, clearly and definitively where the artists and 
hitects subject to his attack will be placed. There can be no-or 
·1 e no-discussion or dissent as to their historical secondariness.
no possible future re-evaluation. Further, they are situated
mediately"-by some law of history rather than by the author's
ssment of their work. Such a history then must function
onomously, cut away from human agency-which is exactly
tray to the view of the subject that the essay initially constructs.
rtier in the text this passage occurs:
It is endemic to the syndrome of authoritarianism that it appeal to and affirm the "eternal" or ancient systems of order (the law of the tribe, the authority of history, the paternal principal of the master, etc.) 
t it is exactly that authority of history to which, or with which, the 
· e of the text speaks at that point. If a text whose basic thrust is
9inst the imposition of authoritarian structures of representation 
n fall prey to using those same structures itself, the whole attack 
ainst representation in painting both post-1915 and current must 
more carefully weighed. 
eSubiect 
y history is tied to a specific construction of the subject, and a 
stoy as absolute, linear, and continuous as that in Buchloh's essay 
will e mirrored by as absolute a subject. 
Aries of rhetorical questions establishes that subject as one 
uivalent to the omniscient narrator of the classical novel: fully 
conscious, moving history forward decisively: 
But would it not be more appropriate to conceive of these radical shifts of the perids between the wars, with such dec i sive select ion s of production procedures ,  
iconographic references, and perceptual conventions as calculated? Should we not assume that every artist mak­ing these decisions would be aware of their ramifications and consequences, of the sides they would be taking in the process of aesthetic indentification and ideological representations? 
s with every rhetorical question, the reader can only answer yes, 
fiming what the author has argued. The subject we must assent to 
ione who already knows, in a history which is already seen, what 
e ramifications and consequences of his or her procedures, 
eferences, and perceptual conventions will be. It is important to 
hasize that "ramifications and consequences" create a future. 
b the subject can only be held responsible to the degree that 
:hloh demands if the work's future effects are known before the 
k-as a series of decisions-is made. In other words, we are not 
cny responsible for our acts, but for their future effects. And those 
e effects are already clear to us before we choose to act. Lastly, 
e text is asserting that acts, decisions (and therefore 
iousness) are the engines which drive history. That view of 
, and of the subject, is exactly what Foucault and Braudel have 
· d. They attempt to construct a different, discontinuous way
presenting history and its subject. Foucault writes in The Order 
of Things: 
If there is one approach that I do reject, however, it is that (one might call it, broadly speaking, the phenomenologi­cal approach ) which gives absolute priority to the observing subject, which attributes a consistent role to an act, which places its own point of view at the origin of all historicity-which, in shot, leads to a transcendental 
consciousness. 
The subject displayed in Buchloh's rhetorical questions is one who 
has priority, who is able to choose-to calculate-from among "the 
production procedures, iconographic references, and perceptual 
conventions ... aware of their ramifications and consequences." The 
subject has a full consciousness, and thus a control, over its choices 
among these methods and conventions as though it was "above" or 
"outside" them. A better writing of the subject in a situation of 
choosing among the many codes, methods, conventions etc. might 
be one which represented the subject as "inside" the conventions 
about which (s)he is trying to exercise some choice. Perhaps it would 
be to write a subject who is those codes, conventions, and methods; 
for whom those conventions, methods, codes are the means of 
perception. However, there should be caution here. This subject­
the one who is a nodal point of various methods, codes, 
conventions-can become as absolute as Buchloh's. Only this 
subject would deny any ability to choose, or any discontinuity in the 
subject or among the various methods and codes. 
If we are to talk in a language of consciousness and responsibility, 
then it seems to me that Buchloh's text goes too far in its 
construction of the subject as fully conscious and calculating amid its 
displayed choices and their future effects. Critical texts are all too 
prone to becoming devices for the projection of the illusion of full 
consciousness. Like anyone else, the critic is the product of a certain 
social and intra-psychic division of labour-which here makes a 
fetish of consciousness and projects it onto the artwork as the sole 
value and the sole purpose or experience of human life. If one wants 
neither to deny the subject as having any choice, nor any 
responsibility for choice-and at the same time wishes to avoid the 
illusion of full consciousness which directs Buchloh's text-perhaps 
we should represent the subject as "inside" the multitude of 
conventions, methods, and codes which are never simply exterior to 
the subject but are in fact her or his means of perceiving both the 
world and the setf. And we should write as well the discontinuities 
among the many codes which keep any one code, any one 
socialization, from an absolute hegemony within the subject, and 
which keep the subject and its acts from any completed unity or 
control. 
Similarly, we could think of the subject at the point of choosing 
among the many conventions and methods available as already only 
partly responsible. And as the "ramifications and consequences" of 
their choices extends into the future, these would grow increasingly 
unforseeable. Thus the subject is in fact an increasingly 
discontinuous series of effects, which are never, even at the moment 
of choosing, identical with the subject or the subject's 
consciousness; and grow increasingly discontinuous and 
uncontrollable with distance and time. 
As its construction of the subject shows, Buchloh's history is 
determined by consciousness. The aesthetic pleasure ("supplied as 
false consciousness, or vice versa") of reading and engaging yourself 
with Buchloh's text may principally by that of feeling allied with a 
vast and unifying view, which is an experience of a lucidity without 
contr-adiction, an illusory control of or in history which allows 
everything to be seen in its place. 
Fortunately, the text finds itself in contradiction with itself about the 
subject and its degree of consciousness. On page 105, we read: 
"None of the manifold features of this eclecticism should be seen as 
random; they confirm one another ii an intricate network of 
historical meaning, which may, however be read differently from the 
intentions of the author or the interests of their audience and the 
art historians who constitute their historical reception." (My 
emphasis). If this is true, then every work is opened to interpretation; 
it finds itself in a conflictual plurality of voices. The artist then cannot 
be said to have control of the work or its effects. Even the class 
interests of the work's author will not be able to control all readings 
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Carlo Carra; Patriotic Celebration; 1914. 
or uses of the work. Other voices, such as Buchloh's here, will take 
up the work for their own, other, purposes. So it cannot simply be 
claimed, as the text initially does, that "every artist making these 
decisions would be aware of the ramifications and consequences of 
the sides they would be taking in the process of aesthetic 
identifications and ideological representations." The artist would 
have to be conscious of uses of the work-interpretations-which 
had not yet been made, historical perspectives not yet suggested, 
sequences of future works which would then reconstrue, resituate 
their own work. History itself would have to be already-written, 
already-seen, rather than a process and a product of conflict. 
Representation 
Like most criticism, Buchloch's essay seems unaware of its own 
practices. After declaring that representation in painting is "obsolete" 
and "retrograde", authoritarian in its very form, the text proceeds a 
though its language and rhetorical structures, its repre entation of 
history, were neutral or transparent. 
The essay is as much a traditional representational form, and means 
of production, as the naturalist painting; it is the "fiction" variant of 
the classical novel. Just as the narrative in such a novel is moved 
forward by the omniscient narrator from whom nothing in the world 
of the text is hidden, the argument in the essay is advanced by a 
voice which speaks with certainty about, or from within, a history 
whose end is clearly visible, and with which the voice is identical. 
History as it is presented in the text is brought to a focus in the 
position of the author's central and unifying view. That historical 
view-we habitually refer to it as "historical perspective" -is the 
temporal equivalent of the Renaissance perspective which was the 
core of visual and spatial ordering systems that the text says had 
"defined pictorial production since the Renaissance and had in turn 
been systematically broken down since the middle of the nineteenth 
century". Those allied temporal orders have neither been broken 
down nor questioned in Buchloh's text. Just as the narrator of the 
classical novel is never implicated in the world which the text 
establishes, the author here is not implicated within the text's system 
of representation or means of production, speaking instead from 
"above'' or "outside" or from "nowhere", a god to the text as much 
as any traditional narrator. 
The modernist collage is used in the essay as a privileged example 
from which earlier practices can be questioned. Perhaps here I can 
use it to question the text, to test specific criticisms by asking of the 
critical text what it asks of an artwork. 
Quite unlike the modernist collage, in which various frag­ments and materials of experience are laid bare, revealed as fissures, voids, unresolvable contradictions, irrecon­cilable particularities, pure heterogeneity, the historicist image pursues the opposite aim: that of synthesis, of the illusory creation of a unity and a totality which concealsits historical determination and conditioned particularity. Th is mode qt a uni fied pictor ial representation, homogeneous in mode, mater ial, and style, is treacherous, supplying as it does aesthetic pleasure as false consciousness, or vice versa. 
If this passage is correct, then the essay itself must be classified as 
historicist since its attempts to construct a unified representation (of 
history), and is "homogeneous in modes, material, and style". And 
while the text is not without its contradictions, these are not 
presented or placed in visibility as in the modernist collage, but are 
submerged in the unity of the voice. One of the strengths of 
Buchloh's text is that it attempts to show the historical determination 
of certain painting practices both after 1915 and currently. But how 
could one argue that his text attempts to show its own "historical 
determination and conditioned particularity"? What does it mean for 
a text to condemn other works for concealing their historical 
determination while concealing its own? 
Perhaps no text has a sufficient command of itself and of histoy that 
it can reveal its own historical determination. The text in this case­
Buchloh's e say-can only maintain the image of a consciou ne 
which see itself and it multiple determinations when it maintains 
history as imple, linear, continuous, progressive, univocal, and only 
when it speaks from "nowhere", in a language which is treated as 
oough it were somehow neutral. If we ask of a text what it demands 
of an artwork, in that reading it becomes difficult to maintain that the 
text has the required self-consciousness, or the necessary command 
of history, to succeed as its own test case. 
The c ollage is also a means by which the representation of history as 
linear and continuous and univocal can be challenged. If I can go 
outside Buchloh's text for a moment to quote from an anthology on 
the subject of collage, it is fairly clear that collage is destructive of the 
vey history which the essay maintains. 
Its heterogenity, even if it is reduced by every operation of composition, imposes itself on the reading as stimula­tion to produce a signification which could be neither univocal nor stable. Each cited element breaks the con­tinuity or the linearity of the discourse and leads necessarily to a double reading: that of the fragment per­ceived in relation to its text of origin; that of the same f ragment as incorporated into a new whole, a different totality. The trick of collage consists also of never entirely supressing the alterity of these elements reunited in a temporary composition. Thus the art of col­lage proves to be one of the most effective strategies in the putting into question of all the illusions of representa­tion. 
Hwe are to agre with Buchloh's text and use the collage as a 
'ivileged example for our practices, then the history which the text 
maintains will have to be discarded in favour of one which is 
di continuous, multiple, conflictual-a "wide" rather than a "narrow" 
listoy. If we agree with the history his text maintains, then we 
cannot refer to the collage as a privileged example from which other 
orks can be criticized for concealing their historical determination m conditioned particularity, nor for a "unified pictorial 
ipresentation", nor for being "homogeneous in mode, material, and 
le." Or el e the question, the actual practices of the situation in 
which we ar all involved, is more complex than Buchloh's text 
�ws. 
Tre is one last aspect of the text's representational practices which 
I ould like to address. The avant-garde (within art history) is roughly 
quivalent to a vanguard revolutionary party. It seems to me that 
hhloh's essay is based throughout on the assumption that a 
vanguard party can represent history itself. The question of 
presentation is therefore also a question of political representation. 
Te wh ole question of the vanguard party representing history is too 
complex to do it justice here, yet it is a fundamental question. I will 
· ply state that I do not believe that the vanguard can (or does)
resent history, and therefore I do not have any simple faith in the
otion of an avant-garde practice. I cannot see how a small vanguard
py can in practice fail to be destructive of a radical and democratic
f-representation, or of the allied notion of history as a complex
cnflictual plurality of voices and constituencies. On of the
most fundamental questions which could be a ked one ming
hhloh's text, then, is: "Can a vanguard party represent history?" For
who have doubts that it can, the question might then be asked 
ether the notions of a vanguard party, or of an avant-garde in art, 
not at least potentially a representing of history which can 
come authoritarian, rather than a signal of an emancipatory 
· toy. I won't pretend to know the answer.
For behind the idea of social evolution was an unconscious attachment to the development of a single form. Social development was unconsciously based on the experience of one type of Western Society, and its imperialist contacts with more "primitive" societies. The real social and cultural variation of human history was thus reduced to a single model: unilinear and predictable. Even Marxists took over this limited model, and its rigidity 
has been widely experienced in some twentieth-century communist practice. A more adequate understanding of oth natural and cultural evolution would have made so mechanical and unilinear a model untenable, for it would have emphasised both variation and creativity and thus a more genuinely open and (in the full sense) revolutionary 
future. Raymond Williams, Modern Tragedy • 
Alexander Rodchenko; Romance (Circa Scene); 1935. 
